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National Bureau of Economic Research
This essay surveys recent research on labor and labor markets dur 
ing the Great Depression. Fascinated by an economy in which unem 
ployment reached nearly a quarter of the labor force and unemployment 
rates hovered in double digits for a decade, economists have been 
studying the Great Depression ever since it occurred. For the most part, 
the perspective taken has been an aggregate one, as befits the most 
important macroeconomic event of the century. However, much of the 
most interesting current research has delved into the "black box" of 
aggregate statistics by examining microeconomic evidence. Such evi 
dence has highlighted important features of labor market behavior that 
were masked in aggregate data. It has also altered conventional inter 
pretations of various government policies adopted in the 1930s, such as 
work relief, that were aimed at combatting high unemployment. While 
my primary objective is to survey this research, I also attempt to add to 
it by presenting some preliminary findings on patterns of self-employ 
ment in the late 1930s.
LABOR AT THE MACRO LEVEL
Although this survey is centered on recent microeconomic 
research, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing some of the basic 
aggregate statistics. These are shown in Table 1, which gives two 
series of unemployment rates along with a "real wage" index.
The aggregate statistics tell a familiar story. According to the first 
unemployment series, labeled "Lebergott," unemployment rose to 
unprecedented levels between 1929 and 1933, peaking at nearly 25 
percent of the labor force. Moreover, the rate of unemployment
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SOURCE: Margo (1993), p. 43.
remained very high through the decade, although it did decline (except 
during the recession of 1938). On the eve of World War II, fully 14.6 
percent of the labor force was out of, and looking for, work. By Amer 
ican standards these rates are extraordinarily high, although recent 
experience in Western Europe (particularly Spain) makes them seem 
somewhat less unusual.
The second unemployment series, labeled "Darby," tells a rather 
different story. The run-up in unemployment between 1929 and 1932 
is still present, but the series diverge sharply afterwards. The Darby 
series is different because it considers anyone who had a "work-relief 
job as no different from anyone who had a regular job. This assump 
tion is certainly debatable (see, for example, Kesselman and Savin 
1978), and I will return to this point later.
Aside from the levels of unemployment, the duration of unemploy 
ment was also severe in the 1930s. Prior to the 1930s, the "incidence" 
of unemployment—the fraction of the nonfarm labor force experienc 
ing unemployment in a given year—was relatively high. Using census
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data for 1910, I have estimated that approximately 19 percent of the 
nonfarm labor force experienced unemployment during a year's time, 
compared with roughly 14 percent in the late 1970s (Margo 1990a). In 
1910 and in the late 1970s, the aggregate unemployment rate was 
approximately the same (4.8 percent). The implication is that the 
"duration" of unemployment was much briefer in 1910 than in the late 
1970s, while the probability of becoming unemployed was higher.
The probability of becoming unemployed was certainly very high 
for the average worker in the early 1930s, but what changed was the 
duration of unemployment. Many people who lost jobs in the 1930s 
remained unemployed for long periods of time. According to the Mas 
sachusetts state census of 1934, fully 63 percent of the currently unem 
ployed had been out of work for a year or longer (Margo 1991). These 
percentages fell as the decade progressed, but even in 1940, fully 41 
percent of unemployed adult males in the nonfarm labor force had 
been out of work for over a year. 1
Exactly why the average duration of unemployment increased in 
the 1930s is unclear, since the obvious institutional mechanisms that 
produce such outcomes today were not yet in place. For example, long- 
term unemployment is high in Europe today partly because European 
welfare states have a dizzying array of policies that subsidize it. 
"Insider-outsider" models, popular among neo-Keynesians, are diffi 
cult to apply to the 1930s because the internal labor markets that pro 
duce outsiders were largely (although not wholly) irrelevant. Later I 
will suggest that excess duration may have been an unintended by 
product of the New Deal, in particular, the work-relief programs.
The final column in Table 1 gives the standard "real wage" series 
for the 1930s—average hourly earnings of production workers in man 
ufacturing. In 1930, when unemployment was 8.7 percent, the index 
stood at 75.7 (relative to a base of 100 in 1940). In 1933, when unem 
ployment peaked at 24.9 percent, the index was higher—79.5 percent. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate understates the depressed level of 
labor utilization, since weekly hours of work also fell between 1929 
and 1933. After 1933, real wages continued to rise, despite double- 
digit unemployment. The total increase over the decade is about 25 
index points, pretty good performance in light of labor market condi 
tions.
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There are a number of possible interpretations of Table 1. Unless 
one is prepared to argue that labor supply schedules shifted inward 
from 1929 to 1933, it is difficult to come up with a convincing equilib 
rium explanation of why labor utilization fell but real wages 
increased. 2 Disequilibrium stories are easier to fashion. The first, and 
most common, is wage rigidity. Labor demand sloped downward, but 
for reasons that are not fully clear, wages were rigid downward, pro 
ducing unemployment. Some developments in modern macroeconom 
ics have filtered into this interpretation. Martin Baily (1983) argues 
that "aggressive" wage cutting would have lowered worker morale, 
even in the 1930s. Others, such as Richard Jensen (1989), suggest that 
firms had been adopting "efficiency-wage" policies for some time prior 
to the 1930s, and these mitigated against wage cuts. Peter Temin 
(1990) has pointed out that wages were apparently less rigid downward 
in Germany, and this may be a key reason why German employment 
rose smartly after the initial downturn in that country (although others 
attribute the recovery to Nazi tinkering with employment statistics). 
Anthony O'Brien (1989) suggests that business leaders in the early 
1930s firmly believed that wage cuts in the early 1920s had exacer 
bated the post-World War I recession, and therefore, they were reluc 
tant to cut wages in the 1930s.
Still others point the finger at the New Deal, specifically the 
National Recovery Act (or NRA). In an influential book, Michael 
Weinstein (1980) argues that the NRA substantially raised wages 
above what they would otherwise have been, particularly for unskilled 
labor (which dominates the series in Table 1). However, in a recent 
study that (in my opinion) took great care econometrically, Ben Ber- 
nanke (1986) found much smaller effects of the NRA. Bernanke's 
study is also noteworthy because it investigated the interaction between 
wage rigidity and "work-sharing." Work-sharing occurs when firms 
cut weekly (scheduled) hours instead of employment. Bernanke 
argues that, beyond a certain point, it paid to reduce hours more at the 
margin than employment. However, hours reductions came at a 
price—workers would accept further reductions in hours only if their 
hourly wages did not decline (since this would make their weekly earn 
ings fall less than their weekly hours).
An alternative explanation is that the wage series in the final col 
umn overstates the extent of rigidity. The idea here, which is familiar
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from recent studies of wage changes over the business cycle, is that the 
employed are not a random sample of the labor force (and are less so 
during downturns). In particular, if low-productivity (and hence low- 
wage) workers are laid off first, then the wages of employed workers 
may look more rigid downward than they actually are. Some evidence 
that this is the case has recently been put forth by Stanley Lebergott 
(1989). Lebergott has looked at wages at the firm level (General Elec 
tric and Westinghouse—both of which are included in the series), find 
ing that wages fell by 10 percent from 1929 to 1931 yet the industry 
average did not. In effect, Lebergott is arguing that the aggregate data 
are misleading about actual labor market outcomes in the 1930s, a 
point of view that is consistent with evidence on the heterogeneity of 
unemployment.
THE MICROECONOMICS OF 
DEPRESSION UNEMPLOYMENT
A great deal of research on the Depression by labor economists has 
proceeded as if the statistics in Table 1 applied to a representative 
worker, implying that the behavior of the representative worker tells us 
everything we need to know. This is more than a little odd because, 
even at its worst, 75 percent of the labor force was employed during the 
Depression—the average employed worker could not have been, 
almost by definition, the same as the average unemployed worker.
Heterogeneity has come back into fashion in macroeconomics. We 
know that heterogeneity can inform about the nature of both supply 
and demand in the labor market. Investigation of heterogeneity in the 
1930s is at an early stage, but it has proceeded far enough to report to a 
wider audience.
The heterogeneity of unemployment has received the most atten 
tion, primarily because of the availability of the 1940 public use micro- 
data sample (PUMS), a large random sample of the original responses 
given to census enumerators. The great advantage here is the availabil 
ity of individual level responses—we can, in other words, study what 
happened to individuals during the 1930s as individuals, not as repre-
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sentative "agents." It is true that 1940 is not 1933, but there are other 
sources—albeit none as good as the 1940 PUMS—to investigate.
The 1940 census is one of the great documents of American statis 
tical history. The census was the first to ask about many things, includ 
ing income, educational attainment, and weeks worked. It also 
included questions on unemployment that, because of various quirks, 
allow the investigation of many questions relating to the operation of 
the New Deal work-relief programs, a point that I will return to shortly.
Analysis of the 1940 PUMS reveals that the unemployed were dis 
proportionately young or older and tended to have fewer skills and less 
education than employed persons. These differences were starker 
comparing the employed with the long-term unemployed (those out of 
work for more than a year) or (in certain respects, such as race) with 
persons on work relief (Margo 1988, 1991). Although it is an over 
statement to claim that unemployment before the 1930s was "egalitar 
ian," it is true that the unemployed were less distinctive in their 
(observable) personal characteristics before, as opposed to after, the 
Great Depression (Margo 1990b).
One important implication of heterogeneity concerns wage rigid 
ity. The fact that the unemployed were a nonrandom sample of the 
labor force means that aggregate wage series, such as in Table 1, are 
biased. It is likely that the evolution of the characteristics of the unem 
ployed over the 1930s is such that the standard aggregate wage index 
overstates the degree of wage rigidity, although the extent of such over 
statement is open to question.
Although the 1940 PUMS is useful for examining the heterogene 
ity of unemployment, it is even more useful for what it reveals about 
New Deal work-relief programs. As the Depression unraveled, it 
became painfully evident that old-style "relief," primarily the work of 
private agencies and churches, was inadequate to deal with the volume 
of unemployment. As a result, public relief was expanded, and work 
relief—literally, the combination of welfare and work—became an 
important mode of delivering assistance to the unemployed. (Unem 
ployment insurance, another form of relief, was also adopted in the 
1930s, after several decades of relative inaction.) The best known 
work-relief program was that undertaken by the Work Projects Admin 
istration (WPA), although there were many others (such as the Civilian 
Conservation Corps [CCC]).
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By design, and also by a strange statistical quirk, the 1940 PUMS 
contains a great deal of information about work relief. I say, "by 
design," because the census permitted "work relief to be one of the 
answers to its question on labor force status. At the time, persons with 
work-relief jobs were counted as "unemployed," and this convention 
was accepted by Stanley Lebergott (1964) when he constructed his 
now-famous unemployment series. In an equally famous paper, 
Michael Darby (1976) argued that persons working for the WPA were, 
in fact, "employed." Treating them as such has a dramatic effect on the 
aggregate unemployment rate, as Table 1 demonstrates.
Like many questions in macroeconomics, deciding which of these 
two points of view is "right" is basically a theological matter. In a 
series of papers (Margo 1988, 1991, 1993), I have tried to redirect 
attention away from the metaphysical question of "who is employed" 
to a different question: Did the WPA affect labor supply (or labor 
demand)? The conventional wisdom among economists is that the 
unemployed of the 1930s were simply that—unemployed, with zero 
opportunity cost. Indeed, the very concept of the fiscal multiplier of 
Keynesian lore is predicated on the point of view that the opportunity 
cost of unemployed labor is zero.
The first piece of evidence I uncovered is more tantalizing than a 
"smoking gun." Table 2 shows the distribution of weeks of unemploy 
ment among those currently unemployed (but not on work relief) in 
March of 1940 (the census week) and the distribution of weeks of 
unemployment among those on work relief. Recall that the census 
(and later, Lebergott) considered those on work relief as unemployed, 
so they asked a question: When was your last private sector job of one 
month or more? Note that the two distributions differ quite radically, 
in that persons on work relief were vastly more likely to have been out 
of work for over a year.
By itself this is not a particularly novel finding. The WPA knew 
that its "workers" were disproportionately the long-term unemployed. 
However, there are two interpretations of this result. The first, a benign 
one for the "zero opportunity" cost model, is that work relief was a 
"last resort," chosen after an exhaustive but fruitless search for a real 
job. The second, potentially not so benign, is that people remained 
with the WPA for a long time.
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a PEW = public emergency work relief.
Because of a quirk it is possible to use the 1940 PUMS to see 
which interpretation is correct. The census asked people how many 
weeks they worked in 1939, treating weeks with the WPA the same as 
weeks in a regular job. Thus, for example, it is possible to find people 
in the 1940 census who were (a) on work relief in March of 1940, and 
(b) reported that they had been unemployed for 65 weeks (all of 1939 
and the first quarter of 1940) but who had worked 39 to 52 weeks in 
1939. These are people who could only have been "employed" on 
work relief (assuming they answered the census questions correctly), 
essentially full time.
As it happens, approximately 50 percent of all persons on work 
relief in March of 1940 and "unemployed" 65 weeks or more actually 
worked 39 weeks or more in 1939. It is but a small step to infer that 
full-time employment on work relief reduced job search activity and 
that, perhaps more controversially, work relief was "preferred" to the 
next best alternative.
Why might work relief have been preferred? First, while work- 
relief jobs were low-paying, there were private sector workers making 
less per hour. The exact percentages are hard to determine, but 25 per 
cent is a good round number (Finegan and Margo 1994, p. 67). Sec 
ond, and perhaps more important, work relief was a pretty steady job. 
This seems surprising, because the WPA was always ending projects, 
and turnover from project employment was always quite high. But 
project employment was not the same as WPA employment, as some
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workers simply rolled over into a new project, albeit with a few weeks 
of vacation.
Some "smoking gun" evidence that work relief affected labor sup 
ply directly is provided in a paper by T. Aldrich Finegan and myself 
(1994), which reexamines an old chestnut of labor economics—the 
famous debate between W.S. Woytinsky and Clarence Long over the 
relative sizes of the added-worker and discouraged-worker effects in 
the late 1930s. The added-worker effect is the idea that other family 
members have an incentive to seek employment when the head of the 
household becomes unemployed. The discouraged-worker effect is the 
idea that persons without jobs are discouraged from looking for work 
when the unemployment rate is high. Woytinsky (1942) believed that 
there were large numbers of added workers who would withdraw from 
the labor force once conditions improved. Long (1958) thought Woy 
tinsky was wrong and had a table from the published 1940 census to 
prove it, or so he thought. The table showed the labor force participa 
tion rates of married women cross-classified by their husband's 
employment status. If Woytinsky was right, reasoned Long, the labor 
force participation rate of women with unemployed husbands should 
exceed the participation rate of women with employed husbands. In 
fact, according to Long's table, there was no such difference in 1940— 
if anything, the participation rate of women with unemployed hus 
bands was slightly lower than the participation rate of women with 
employed husbands. The added-worker effect, in other words, 
appeared to be negative.
Subsequent generations of labor economists (including Professor 
Finegan) were taught that Long was right. However, Long was wrong, 
and for an interesting reason: the WPA actually reduced the incentive 
for "secondary" workers to enter the labor force.
Table 3 gives the labor force participation rate of married women 
by their husband's employment status, as computed from the 1940 
PUMS. Note that, if the husband was on work relief, the labor force 
participation rate was very low (about 6.6 percent), while if the hus 
band had a regular job, the participation rate was 16.1 percent. How 
ever, if the husband was unemployed but not on work relief, the 
participation rate was 22.8 percent—a clear added-worker effect.
The table from the published 1940 census that convinced Long 
was quite different from the evidence in Table 3, in that Long's table
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Table 3 Labor Force Participation Rates of Married Women, by 
Husband *s Employment Status, March 1940
% of wives in labor force 
in 1940 who were
Husband's status
Employed in 1940
On PEW in 1940
Unemployed in 1940
OnPEWinl939d
Not on PEW in 1939
Out of labor force
Total











































SOURCE: Finegan and Margo (1994, p. 71).
a N is the sample size.
b LFPR is the labor force participation rate, the proportion of women in the sample who
were employed, on public emergency work relief (PEW), or unemployed, during the
census week (March 24-30, 1940).
c "Employed" means employed in a private sector or non-PEW job. 
d "On PEW in 1939" identifies husbands who were unemployed in the census week and
who held a PEW job at some time in 1939.
lumped unemployed husbands and husbands with work-relief jobs 
together in a single category. (We know this from a note in very tiny 
print elsewhere in the volume that Long cited.) If we replicate the cen 
sus procedure in Table 3, the labor force participation rate of married 
women with unemployed husbands (now counting the ones with work- 
relief jobs as unemployed) is 14.9 percent. As far as Finegan and I 
know, Long's mistake was inadvertent—he had no way of knowing of 
the association between work relief and the added-worker effect.
Why would the WPA have inhibited the added-worker effect? Fin 
egan and I think eligibility requirements are the key. Not just any- 
unemployed worker was eligible for a work-relief job; the family had 
to pass a means test, and the earnings of other family members (to 
varying degrees) were counted. Although wages on WPA projects 
were relatively low, they were better than what many married women
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could command in the labor market. Thus for many couples, a job with 
the WPA for the husband with his wife at home was better than no job 
and his wife working. We reinforce this conclusion in our paper by 
showing that labor force participation by married women jumped when 
their husbands left work relief but had not found a regular job by the 
census week.
Finegan and I think the importance of this work is not the resolu 
tion of a crusty old debate between two deceased labor economists, but 
rather that, even under extremely trying macroeconomic circum 
stances, incentives "mattered." Had the WPA been smaller, it is possi 
ble that the unemployment rate among adult males would have been 
higher, but our results suggest that more married women would have 
entered the labor force. In designing welfare programs, there is always 
a tradeoff between the desire to help those in need and the desire to 
minimize deadweight loss. The architects of Roosevelt's New Deal 
could not avoid this tradeoff any more than their modern day counter 
parts have been able to do under much less trying macroeconomic cir 
cumstances.
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND 
THE GREAT COMPRESSION
One of the central policy issues of the last 25 years has been the 
surge in wage inequality. Simply put, the earnings of college graduates 
relative to high school graduates are far higher today than they were ca. 
1970. Wage differences within labor market groups—for example, the 
dispersion in wages among college graduates—are also much higher. 
The increase in wage inequality has taken place against a backdrop of 
very little aggregate real wage growth, so that for some population 
groups (such as the bottom 40 percent of high school graduates), real 
wages are lower today than in the early 1970s.
Much has been made by the popular media (not to mention in the 
political arena) of the alleged uniqueness of this recent episode in the 
history of American inequality. It is believed that the long-run trend in 
wage inequality—"long-run" here meaning since the turn of the 20th 
century—has been distinctly downward, and recent changes are a
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reversal of that trend. In particular, the benchmark most in use is in 
equality in the period 1950 to 1970.
Until recently it was widely believed that the Great Depression 
helped produce a more egalitarian income distribution (Williamson and 
Lindert 1980). The Great Depression was a great "leveller"—that is, 
the distribution of income became much more equal in the 1930s, con 
tinued to do so in the 1940s, and then stayed that way for some time. 
Recent research on American wage history, however, has modified this 
view (Goldin and Margo 1992).
Exactly what happened to the distribution of wages in the 1930s is 
still in the process of reconstruction. What appears to have happened is 
that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor widened in 
the early years of the Depression. The extent of widening was consid 
erably greater in the case of weekly wages than hourly wages, because 
there were substantial declines in weekly hours worked in the early 
1930s, and the decline in weekly hours was greater among the 
unskilled. The wage structure snapped back, however, and by 1939 it 
appears to have been little different from its counterpart in the late 
1920s. This is a little surprising, since unemployment was far higher in 
1939 than in 1929. As already mentioned, unemployment in the 1930s 
was far worse among the less-skilled and less-educated. We might 
have expected the vast reserve army of unemployed and underem 
ployed among the less-skilled and less-educated to have bid down their 
relative wages, but it did not happen, perhaps because various New 
Deal policies (such as work relief) propped up wages in the lower tail 
of the distribution.
If the Great Depression did not usher in any vast changes in wage 
distributions, what did? The answer: the "Great Compression," which 
occurred in the 1940s and produced a substantial narrowing in wage 
inequality.
What is remarkable about the Great Compression is that the quan 
titative dimensions of change were nearly the mirror image of recent 
experience. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentiles in weekly 
wages declined by nearly 25 percent between 1940 and 1950, approxi 
mately the same percentage as the increase that occurred between 1970 
and 1985. The narrowing in wage inequality took place at both tails of 
the wage distribution. The gap between the median wage and the 90th 
percentile fell by 14 percent, and the gap between the 10th percentile
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and the median decreased by 11 percent. Consistent with these 
changes, the earnings of skilled and educated workers fell relative to 
the earnings of less-skilled and less-educated workers between 1940 
and 1950. Relative to the nonfarm average, the weekly earnings of 
white-collar workers declined between 1940 and 1950, while the rela 
tive earnings of factory operatives, personal service workers, and 
unskilled laborers increased.
Like the surge in earnings inequality that has occurred recently, the 
Great Compression was not solely, or even mostly, a narrowing of 
wage differentials between groups. Wage compression also occurred 
within groups, as defined by educational attainment, labor market 
experience, and occupation. One (very important) point of difference 
between the Great Compression and recent experience is that during 
the 1940s, real wages for everybody rose substantially. Redistribution 
was not achieved at the expense of declining real wages for some occu 
pation or educational group, as is the case recently: rising inequality in 
the past 20 years has occurred against a backdrop of stagnant or barely 
rising real wages for the average worker. The increased dispersal of 
wages around the average implies that some groups have gained pur 
chasing power in absolute terms, while others have lost absolutely. 
From a political economy perspective, redistribution is less a "prob 
lem" when living standards are generally rising than when they are not.
Although their relative significance is a matter of debate, the fac 
tors behind the Great Compression are not difficult to identify. Some 
portion of the Compression occurred early in the decade as a direct 
result of wartime shifts in labor demand and of government regulation 
of the wartime economy. Various bits of data suggest that the indus 
tries that expanded output during World War II were disproportionately 
employers of less-skilled and less-educated labor. Federal government 
policy also played a role. The National War Labor Board (NWLB), 
established in 1942, was responsible for approving all wage increases. 
Given the volume of cases under its purview, the NWLB reached deci 
sions using various rules of thumb, several of which undeniably com 
pressed the wage structure at its left tail. 3
World War II eventually ended and the NWLB went out of busi 
ness. With respect to the immediate postwar period, three factors main 
taining wage compression were an unexpectedly large increase in the 
relative supply of educated workers (partly a consequence of the GI Bill
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of Rights, which subsidized college attendance by veterans); increases 
in the level and coverage of the federal minimum wage; and a robust 
union movement. Only the latter two factors can be traced to the Great 
Depression: the federal minimum wage was first enacted in the 1930s, 
and the Wagner Act enhanced the ability of unions to organize.
The Great Compression was not to last much past 1950. By the 
early 1950s, there is evidence of a shift in relative demand towards bet 
ter-educated workers. By 1960, the Great Compression had been 
partly reversed, evidently because the increase in relative supply of 
educated labor in the 1950s simply did not keep pace with the increase 
in relative demand. Still, the wage distribution on the eve of the 
Kennedy administration was far more equal than it had been 30 years 
earlier or than it would become a quarter century later.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE 1930s
All of the research I have reviewed thus far is of the published vari 
ety. I would like to take a few moments to talk about some work in 
progress involving self-employment in the 1930s.
One of Herbert Hoover's more infamous quotes concerned the 
unemployed. In the early 1930s, Hoover remarked that "[m]any 
(unemployed) persons [have] left their jobs for the more profitable one 
of selling apples on streetcorners."4 If selling apples was so profitable, 
why create make-work government jobs when the unemployed could, 
so to speak, do it on their own?
The self-employment option is an interesting one, since it is, 
apparently, always available. If the unemployed choose to look for a 
job with someone else, as opposed to self-employment, it is hard to 
argue that unemployment is "involuntary" because the self-employed 
are, by definition, employed. For most of the 20th century, self- 
employment was in decline in the United States, although in recent 
decades it has been on the upswing. During the recent recession, self- 
employment was widely reported on in the press, as downsized manag 
ers, frustrated by their lack of success in the conventional job market, 
hung shingles outside their bedrooms and called themselves "consult 
ants."



























Table 4 Aggregate Nonfarm Table 4 shows the aggregate non- 
Self-Employment farm self-employment rate in the 
Rate ( % ) United States—that is, the num 
ber of self-employed in the non- 
farm sector as a fraction of the 
total nonfarm labor force—over 
the 1930s, with 1920 and 1950 as 
benchmarks. It is traditional to 
look at the nonfarm labor force, 
since the great majority of farm 
labor was self-employed and the 
farm labor force has been declin 
ing in proportion for two centu 
ries. Note that the self-employ 
ment rate fell in the early 1930s 
and was otherwise stable during 
the decade. On the basis of the 
aggregate data, it does not appear 
that self-employment was much 
of an option at all for the unem 
ployed.
However, the aggregate self-employment rate is a function of an 
entry "hazard" rate and an exit "hazard" rate. The entry hazard is the 
probability of entering self-employment from some other labor market 
status, while the exit hazard is the probability of leaving self-employ 
ment (the business goes bust, for example). These flows could have 
been rather substantial and yet the aggregate self-employment rate 
quite stable.
Table 5 provides some preliminary evidence on the flow into self- 
employment. It is based on the 1940 PUMS: the sample consists of non- 
farm adult men, ages 30^-9, who did no work (for pay or profit) in 1939 
but who were in the labor force in March of 1940 (there are a few other 
restrictions on the sample). The table shows what these men were doing 
during the census week, one possibility being self-employment. Not 
very surprisingly, the majority were unemployed as of the census date. 
As already suggested, flows into work relief were relatively small. The 
big surprise is the relative importance of self-employment, which cap 
tured a bigger share of the flow into employment than wage and salary
SOURCE: Lebergott (1964, Tables A-3 
and A-4).
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Table 5 Self-Employment in the Late 1930s3
i ——— N ——— \ % of total
Self-employment, total
Proprietors, etc.
Proprietors in wholesale-retail trade
Work relief














SOURCE: 50 percent random sample of the 1940 PUMS.
a Sample consists of males, ages 30-^9 who did no work in 1939 but who were in the
labor force in March of 1940. Farm workers are excluded, as are professionals and
unpaid family labor. 
b Percentages among self-employed (e.g., proprietors in wholesale-retail trade account
for 38.4 percent = 170/443, of all self-employed).
work. (I note, in passing, that the absolute percentages would decline if 
the sample were expanded to include persons out of the labor force, but 
not the relative shares.) Furthermore, fully half of the flow into self- 
employment was accounted for by "proprietors" in general, and nearly 
40 percent by proprietors in wholesale and retail trade (of which food 
dealers were by far the biggest category). Although there is much more 
work to be done, clearly it seems that self-employment was an option for 
many of the jobless, as Hoover seemed to think.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by mentioning a few other topics that I have not 
had space to cover. I have skipped over the effects of the Great Depres 
sion on women and African Americans, but these were certainly sub 
stantial. Claudia Goldin (1990) has demonstrated that "marriage 
bars"—employment policies adopted by firms and governments that 
restricted job opportunities for married women—became more preva 
lent in the 1930s. We know from the work of James Smith (1984; see 
also Margo 1990c and Sundstrom 1992) that the Depression derailed
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economic progress for African Americans; the black-to-white income 
ratio in 1940 was no higher than in 1930. Other important topics not 
addressed concern the impact of the Depression on the subsequent eco 
nomic behavior of those who lived through it (such as savings rates and 
labor supply at older ages), and the political economy of New Deal 
labor legislation.
I have also highlighted the 1940 PUMS in this lecture. There are, 
however, many untapped data sources from the 1930s, some of which 
refer to individuals, others that shed light on geographic variation in 
labor market outcomes, which was also considerable. There is much 
still to learn about labor and labor markets in the 1930s and, fortu 
nately, a good deal of microeconomic evidence to guide our analysis.
Notes
1. "Out of work" here, as is traditional, counts those with work-relief jobs as unem 
ployed. If persons on relief are counted as employed, the percentage falls to 32 
percent (see Margo 1991).
2. One (rather far-fetched) argument goes as follows. Suppose that workers rationally 
expected that demand for their labor would rise substantially in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s with the onset of World War II. Then, more leisure would presumably 
be desired early in the 1930s—an intertemporal substitution effect. For the argu 
ment to make any sense, one would have to believe that World War II would have 
occurred even if the Great Depression had not. Alternatively, if one believes that 
real interest rates were expected to increase in the early 1930s (relative to the rate 
of time preference), one could also rationalize an inward shift in labor supply (as 
the outcome of a dynamic optimization on the part of workers).
3. For example, employers could raise wages to 40 cents per hour without NWLB 
approval; occupational wage "brackets" were established in each region, and 
wages could be increased to the lower end of the bracket. Exceptions to wage 
controls were frequently granted if the NWLB judged that the employer in ques 
tion was previously paying "substandard" wages.
4. Hoover is quoted in Schlesinger, Jr. (1957, p. 241).
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